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AWARDING CUSTODY OF CHILDREN IN ILLINOISREVIEW OF THE FACTORS CONSIDERED BY
THE COURTS
RICHARD MARTIN LYON
HE POLE STAR

in all custody matters between parents is, what

is for the best interest of the child . . ."' Custody, of course,

refers to "the immediate supervision and control of a child." 2
Awards of child custody made incidental to divorce or separation
decrees, therefore, have the primary purpose of "giving ' 3 the child
to one or the other spouse of the broken marriage, and at times to third
parties. Where both parents desire to retain supervision and control
of the child after divorce or separation, the courts are faced with a
difficult judgment, one which is almost entirely a matter of judicial
discretion.
The Illinois statute provides succinctly:
When a divorce shall be decreed, the court may make such order touching
the alimony and maintenance of the wife or husband, the care, custody and
of the
support of the children, or any of them as, from the circumstances
4
parties and the nature of the case, shall be fit, reasonable and just.
'Bastian v. Bastian, 81 Ohio L. Abs. 408, 413, 160 N.E.2d 133, 136 (1959).
2 Sayre, Awarding Custody of Children, in Ass'N OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, SELECTED ESSAYS ON FAMILY LAW, 588 (1950). "By reasonable implication, it usually
carries with it various duties to the child by way of care and support, and it may also
carry rights to the child's services and other advantages. But these rights and duties
may be said to vary with circumstances. . .. [T]hey are not inseparable from the
right of custody alone, and they may remain with the parent and be exercised by him
in spite of granting custody generally to another." Supra, at 590.
3

Sayre observed that custody "is a slippery word. The courts do not always use it
to cover the same things. For instance, is custody co-extensive with the parent's
rights in and duties toward the child, so that the parent can 'give' all these rights and
duties to another when he gives custody? And again, if the parent did give custody
for the whole minority of the child, would this be tantamount to emancipating the
child so far as any residuum of rights and duties in the parent was concerned? Although the language of the courts (and worse still, their thought) on these points
is highly confusing, it seems fair to say . .. that custody is a term applied to interests
less than all the rights and duties of the parent. Even after the parent has given the
longest and fullest rights of custody that he possibly could to another, he still has a
residuum of rights and duties." Sayre, supra at 588.
4 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40 S 19 (1959).
MR. LYON, Ph.D., LL.B., is an Associate Professor, University of Notre Dame; Attorney, Chicago, Ill. Mr. Lyon is a member of the Chicago, American and Indiana
State Bar Associations and Vice-Presidentof the Tri-State Business Law Association.
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And further:
Irrespective if whether the court has or has not in its decree made an order
for the payment of alimony or support, it may at any time after the entry of
a decree for divorce, upon obtaining jurisdiction of the person of the defendant
...make such order for alimony and maintenance of the spouse and the care
and support of the children as, from the evidence and nature of the case, shall
be fit, reasonable and just....
5

Where the parties are separated the court may likewise "upon the
application of either party, make such order concerning the custody
and care of the minor child or children of the parties during the
pendency of the cause as may be deemed expedient and for the benefit
of the child or children, and may award the custody of the minor
child or children of the parties to either party as the interests of the
child or children may require and may make provision for the education and maintenance of the child or children out of the property
of either or both of the parties. '"6
The determination of which parent shall be granted custody of the
offspring requires the courts to evaluate and weigh the competing
circumstances and opportunities offered by the divorced or separated

parents. In carrying out this responsibility, the courts have recognized that they are "clothed with a large discretion." 7 Indeed as was
observed by the Illinois Supreme Court over 100 years ago:
A court of chancery is seldom called upon to exercise a jurisdiction of so embarrassing and important a character as this, or one which requires more serious
and anxious consideration. 8

Justice Spivey of the Appellate Court recently observed that "[I]n
all of the duties of a trial judge there is no graver responsibility placed
upon him than that of deciding the custody of children in the cases
of separated parents. He must call upon all of his background and
wisdom not only as a judge but that of his lay experiences.''
Such judicial discretion as is exercised by the court is only reviewable where the court has abused its discretion. The reviewing court
will not be swayed easily to find an abuse of discretion, but rather
5 Ibid. Pending suit the court may, similarly, "on the application of either party,
make such order concerning the custody and care of the minor children of the parties
... as may be deemed expedient and for the benefit of the children, and may award
the custody of the minor child or children of the marriage to either party as the
interests of the child or children require...I." Id. at § 14.
6 ILL.REv. STAT. ch. 68 S22 (1959).
7 Nye v. Nye, 411 Ill.
408,414, 105 N.E.2d 300, 303 (1952).
8
Miner v. Miner, 11 Ill.
49 (1849).
9Dunning v. Dunning, 14 Ill.
App.2d 242, 249, 144 N.E.2d535, 539 (1957).
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will make every reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness
of the acts of the trial court.10
FACTORS CONSIDERED BY THE COURT IN DETERMINING THE
QUESTION OF CUSTODY OF A MINOR CHILD

Various factors are considered by the courts in determining the
parent or party who is to be given the custody, control and care of
the minor child whose parents are divorced. The primary factor is
that of the welfare and needs of the minor. Other factors considered
by the courts include the age, sex and health and emotional stability
of the child; the preference of the child; race; religion; fault of the
parents as determined in the divorce proceedings; the financial ability
of the parents and the accommodations available for the child.
These factors apply not only when the original custody order is
made, but are important considerations in the modification of such
order and count heavily in showing to the court that circumstances
have so changed as to make a modification essential.
The various factors will now be discussed.
A. The Welfare of the Minor
The welfare and "best interests" of the minor are the paramount
considerations in all custody awards. The welfare of the minor is preeminently the thing to be considered." Innumerable Illinois cases
have reiterated the rule as so stated. 2
B. Age, Sex and Health of the Child
In Illinois it is usual "to place small children in the care of their
mother, if she is a fit person, since maternal care is especially necessary
during early childhood."' 3 The court cautiously added: "This is not
1OBerger v. Berger, 344 Ill. App. 557, 101 N.E.2d 629 (1951). "The function of the
appellate court should be to examine the custody order under consideration in light
of the evidence before the court with the view of 'penciling in' or correcting here
and there the general outline of the plan that the lower court has drawn to govern
the future relationship of divorced parents and their children. The whole outline
should be erased only when wholly inadequate or inconsistent with the facts." Bronson,
Custody on Appeal, 10 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB., 737, 746 (1944).
11 Martinec v. Sharapata, 328 IMl.App. 339, 66 N.E.2d 103 (1946); Peraza v. Tovar,
13 Ill.
App.2d 405, 142 N.E.2d 165 (1957); Landrey v. Landrey, 13 111. App.2d 202, 141
N.E.2d 405 (1957).

12 Cf. numerous annotations in ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40 S 14 (Smith-Hurd 1959), note
115.
13 Wolfrum v. Wolfrum, 5 IMI.App.2d 471, 475, 126 N.E.2d 34, 36 (1955); Nye v.
Nye, 411 11. 408, 105 N.E.2d 300 (1952). It "has been the long established policy of
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an inflexible rule,
however, since the welfare of the child is the prime
4
consideration.'
The Illinois Supreme Court appears to have taken judicial notice
of the fact that "maternal affection is more active and better adapted
to the care of the child."' 5 adding that this is especially "true in the
case of a minor daughter, where the care and guidance of a mother's
hand is doubly important."' 1 To deprive her of custody "compelling
evidence must be presented, proving the mother to be an unfit person
. . or there must be a positive showing that to deny custody to the
mother would be for the best interests of the child."' 7
The rule of law as above stated differs radically from the rule at
common law, which prevailed formerly in this state. Under the
common law rule the father of the child had the paramount right of
custody. This right arose from the obligation imposed on him to
provide for the maintenance of the minor children.' 8 Under ordinary
conditions the right of the mother to the custody of the children
would not arise during the life of the father. Significantly, even under
the common law rule the right of the father to custody was not
absolute. Thus the Supreme Court stated:
*

Upon the extent of the legal right of the father to the custody and control of
his children, many contradictory decisions are to be found; we think it clear,
nevertheless, that he does possess that right, unless he has forfeited, waived or

lost it, either by misconduct, misfortune, or some peculiar circumstances, sufficient in the opinion of an enlightened chancellor to deprive him of it.19
the courts of this state that it is generally to the best interests of children of tender
years to entrust the care and custody to the mother if she is fit and proper . . ." Dunning
v. Dunning, 14 11. App.2d 242,249, 144 N.E.2d 535,539 (1957).
14 Wolfrum v. Wolfrum, 5 Ill. App.2d 471, 475, 126 N.E.2d 34, 36 (1955).
i1Nye v. Nye, 411 M.1 408, 414, 105 N.E.2d 300, 303 (1952).
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.; Israel v. Israel, 8 111. App.2d 284, 131 N.E.2d 555 (1955).
18 Hewitt v. Long, 76 M11.
399 (1875). "Subject to certain limitations . .. at common
law the father was absolutely entitled to the custody of his children until they reached
the age of 21. After his death, the mother was entitled to the custody of her infant
children for nurture, but even this right was superseded after 1660 if the father appointed a testamentary guardian under the provisions of the Tenures Abolition Act.
Common law accorded no other right to the mother as such, and so absolute against
her were the father's rights that he could lawfully claim from her the custody even
of a child at the breast. But even at common law the father's rights might be lost
if to enforce them would lead to the physical or moral harm of the child. Thus
apprehension of cruelty would deprive him of the right to custody, as would his immoral or profligate conduct if the child were likely to be contaminated by it."

Bromley,

FAMILY LAW,

280-81 (1957).

19 Miner v. Miner, 1 Ill. 43, 49. (Emphasis added.)
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The court added:
In no case do I find this legal right of the father asserted, where a divorce has
20
been granted for his fault or misconduct.

C. Race
In a recent case an Illinois court was confronted with the question
whether race alone should outweigh all other factors and be decisive

of the question of custody. 21 In that case, the father, a Negro, had
obtained a divorce from his wife, a Caucasian, alleging desertion. The
defendant wife was not represented by counsel, but agreed that plaintiff should have the care, control and supervision of the two minor
daughters of this marriage. The defendant sought to regain custody
of her children upon remarriage to a Caucasian. The plaintiff in his
answer asserted that his daughters have "the outstanding basic racial
characteristics of the Negro race ... and that for racial and religious
reasons these children will make a better adjustment to life if allowed
to remain identified, reared and educated with the group and basic
stock of the plaintiff, their father. ' 22 The trial court viewed the children in principle, agreed that the condition of either parental home
was "over par, "23 and stated that but for the difference in color the
court "would not hesitate for 'a moment in awarding custody to the
mother.' "24
The defendant appealed on the ground that "the trial court abused
its discretion in denying her custody of the children solely on the
basis of the race and color of defendant mother and the minor children.

' 25

Defendant prevailed. The court's opinion is significant:

In the case before us the competent and experienced trial judge carefully and
conscientiously considered the problem before him, having in mind the best
interests and welfare of the children, and he concluded that such interest and
welfare would be best served by leaving the children to reside with the
father's family under the decree of the court previously entered. However,
from the record before us it appears that the court came to this conclusion
solely because of the racial physical characteristics of the children before him,
and that he would have awarded the custody of the children to the mother
except that they had the appearance of colored children. In passing upon the
question of how the interests and welfare of the children will be best served,
the court can and should take into consideration all relevant considerations
Id. at 50.
21 Fountaine v. Fountaine, 9 111. App.2d 482, 133 N.E.2d 532 (1956).
22 Id. at 484, 133 N.E.2d 534.
24 Ibid.
23 Id. at 485, 133 N.E.2d 534.
25 Ibid.
20
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which might properly bear upon the problem. However, we do not believe
that the question of race alone can overweigh all other considerations and be
decisive of the question .... If this was the sole and decisive consideration on
which the trial court based his decision, and it so appears from the record
before us, we feel that his discretion was not properly exercised under the
circumstances in the case, even though he went to great lengths to ascertain
how the welfare of the children might best be served. 26

The case was remanded to the trial court. The Appellate Court
opinion cited in support In Re Adoption of a Minor. In that case,
an adoption, the Court of Appeals reversed the Board of Public Welfare of the District of Columbia which had denied the adoption of a
white boy by a colored person married to the boy's white mother.
The court there stated:
...denial of the adoption [cannot] rest on a distinction between the 'social
status' of whites and Negroes. There may be reasons why a difference in
race, or religion, may have relevance in adoption proceedings. But that factor
alone cannot be decisive in determining the child's welfare.28

D. Religion, Religious Training and Education
The courts of Illinois-and the courts of other jurisdictions-have
significantly avoided the consideration of religion and religious training as a factor in the award of child custody. The few cases in this
state touching upon the criterion of religion, and the disposition of
these cases, reveal a decided reluctance on the part of the courts to
choose between religions or to give greater weight to one religion
over another. Doing so might involve the courts in serious constitutional dilemmas.29 Consequently, the courts have adopted an attitude
of strict impartiality between religions and will not disqualify any
applicant for custody because of his faith. 0
This is not to say that the religious factor involved in an award
may not be considered by the court; it may well have a bearing on
the outcome." Admittedly, the religious training of a child is "an
element which may be considered among all the circumstances of
gradational significance in promoting the general welfare of the
261 d. at 485-86, 133 N.E.2d 534-35.

228 F.2d 446 (C.A.D.C. 1955).
28 Id. at 448.
"The American courts are constitutionally forbidden to interfere with religious
freedom or to take steps preferring one religion or sect to another." 66 A.L.R.2d
27
29

1410, 1412 (1959).
30

81

Brewer v. Cary, 148 Mo. App. 193, 127 S.W. 685 (1910).
Ibid.

1+6
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child. 32 However, in view of the fact that various factors are considered, "it is difficult to isolate the religious factor and assess what
weight it has been given as a determinant, or to formulate any helpful
33
general rules in this area."1
The rule as stated in Corpus Juris Secundum appears to be consonant with Illinois law:
...the question of religion cannot be considered by the court in determining
the care, custody, and control of minor children of divorced parents, and with
respect to religious conflicts between parties contending for custody, the paramount consideration is the welfare of the child. Accordingly, religious views
afford no ground for depriving a parent, who is otherwise qualified, of custody, and religious teachings of one of the parents to the children, regardless
of how obnoxious the teachings may be to the court, the other parent, or the
general 4public, should not be considered as the basis of making child custody
3
orders.

The Annotated Law Reports, in reviewing the cases from all jurisdictions, conclude that certain general policies appear to be evidenced
by the cases:
First, it seems clear that the courts will not ordinarily make any substantial
sacrifice of a child's purely temporal interests in order to insure that it receives
training in any particular religion. Second, it would seem that where the child
is of an age to have developed a substantial interest in and feeling for a particular religion, the courts will be reluctant to transport him to a home or
atmosphere where he will find it difficult to practice the faith to which he has
become attached. Third, where the nonreligious considerations are in substantial balance, and the child has not as yet become attached to any particular
faith, preference will be given to35the religion of his parents, or of his surviving parent, if one parent is dead.

Thus where the dispute over custody is between a minor's natural
parents, religious differences are given minimal weight. Emphasis of
the child's welfare and best interest criterion takes the courts "off the
hook"-constitutionally, and perhaps politically.
Only three cases appear to discuss religion and religious training in
the context of child custody in the reported cases in Illinois. At the
same time the treatment of the religious issue by the Illinois courts in
adoption cases, 0 as well as the disposition of the question of racial
32 27 B C.J.S. Divorce § 309(a) (1959).
33

66 A.L.R.2d 1410, 1412 (1959).

34 27 B C.J.S. Divorce § 309(a) (1959).
35 66 A.L.R.2d 1410, 1413 (1959).

30 Cf. Lutterbeck, The Law in Illinois Pertaining to the Adoption of Children, 8
DE PAuL L. REv. 165 (1959).
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differences in custody matters, affords ample basis for the conclusion
that religious differences carry little weight with the courts.
The Illinois Supreme Court has held that a mother's adherence to
the Mazdaznan religion could not support a finding that her boy was
a neglected child whose custody should be taken from his mother. 7
It was alleged that the boy also associated with the leader of the
Mazdaznan sect and that this man had written a book which might be
construed as containing improper doctrines. The Court held that absent
any evidence that the religion in question was an immoral one, or that
the sect leader was an immoral man, or engaged in immoral practices,
the statutory provisions for taking the children from the custody of
their parents should not be extended to cases in which there was
merely a difference of opinion as to the best course to pursue in rearing a child.
Said the Court:
She [the mother] may have been misguided in her religious views and mistaken as to the best method of educating and training her boy; but we search
the record in vain for evidence that he [the child] lacked food,8 clothing or
shelter or was being reared in immoral or indecent surroundings.3

In another decision 9 the court made an oblique reference to admitted neglect in providing religious education by a mother. This
factor, however, did not disqualify her from obtaining the custody
of her children. Other considerations led the court to deny her custodial rights.
A third case 40 involved a modification in the custody decree sought
by the father so that sole custody of the minor be awarded to him
because of the mother's alleged breach of agreement that the child
should be enrolled in a Catholic school, and for other reasons. The
court noted that the minor was only five years old and that the mother
on interrogation by the judge had in fact agreed to enroll the child
in a parochial school. The child was clearly too young to be enrolled
in any school at the time of the controversy.
It is significant also that while the Illinois adoption law states that
the "court in entering a decree of adoption shall, whenever possible,
give custody through adoption to a petitioner

. . .

Lindsay v. Lindsay, 257 111. 328, 100 N.E. 892 (1913).
88 Id. at 339-40, 100 N.E. 896.
39 Wellcome v. Wilk, 33911. App. 444,90 N.E.2d 260 (1950).
40
Smith v. Smith, 34011. App. 636,92 N.E.2d 358 (1950).
87

of the same reli-
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gious belief as that of the child," 41 the Supreme Court held this to be
a directory, not mandatory, provision.
42
The matter was brought before the court in Cooper v. Hinrichs.
The lower court had held that a religious difference per se barred the

adoption by Protestants of a child baptized as a Catholic. The Supreme
Court disagreed, stating that the religious protection provision in the
Adoption Act did not bar such adoptions. Rather, the Act "indicates
a legislative intention to stress the religious factor and to direct the
court to give preferences to persons of the same religion as the child
to be adopted, where they are otherwise qualified to promote the

welfare of the child.

43

As was noted by one commentator:
The lower court ... had taken testimony (from a representative of Catholic
Charities, Inc.) concerning the availability of suitable Catholic homes in the
area desirous of adopting children, but the supreme court apparently did not
consider this sufficient to require that the adoption be refused, thus reinforcing
the conclusion
that the best interests of the child is to be the controlling
44
factor.

Other commentators agreed that the best interests of the child
should be the principal consideration in placing a child in adoption,
with the religious aspect to be45 considered along with others in the
sound discretion of the court.
41

ILL.REv.

STAT.

ch 4, § 4-2 (1959).

42 10 Ill.2d 269, 140 N.E.2d 293 (1957).
4 Id. at 276, 140 N.E.2d 297. It may be worth noting that the principal opponent
to the adoption was the mother of the children who had a checkered personal history.
The twin children were born five months after her divorce from their Lutheran father.
"Prior to their birth . . .[she] signed an agreement for their adoption, which she
subsequently repudiated .... [Later] the mother permitted the twins to be declared
dependent in a proceeding brought under the Family Court Act ...and the county

court appointed the probation officer as the legal guardian of the children. He placed
the twins in St. Vincent's Home for Children for several weeks, and then ... placed
them with plaintiffs [who were Presbyterians], who have continuously cared for the
children." Supra, at 271, 140 N.E.2d 294. The children's father consented to the petition for adoption. The children had been baptized in the Catholic faith. The court
noted that as to the mother there was conflicting evidence as to whether she was, in
fact, a Catholic, and "on the issue of her fitness as a mother. Testimony was presented
of her drunkenness, her arrest for disorderly conduct, and her course of illicit relations with men both before and after her divorce from the father of the twins. The
evidence .. .is uncontroverted that .. .[the adoptive parents] are of good moral
character and are capable of properly caring for and rearing the children." Supra, at
272, 140 N.E.2d at 295.
44 Polston, Religion as a Factor in Proceedings for Adoption and Custody of Children, 1957 U. ILL. L. F. 114, 117.

45 Lutterbeck, supra note 35, at 169.
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While the jurisdictions are not unanimous," ample support may be
found outside Illinois for the rule which appears to underlie the few
reported Illinois decisions.
A mother's interest in Rosicrucianism did not disqualify her as
custodian in Kansas. 47 Evidence that the father of an eight-year old girl
was an active adherent of the' Megiddo sect and was raising the child
in that belief, which involved a way of dress and behavior very different from that ordinarily followed by American children, did not
disqualify the father as custodian. The sole criterion is the child's
welfare.48 In another case involving the same parties, this time a habeas
corpus proceeding, the court stated:
The vast majority of matters concerning the upbringing of children must be
left to the conscience, patience and self restraint of father and mother. No end
of difficulties would arise should judges try to tell parents how to bring up
their children. Only when moral, mental, and physical conditions are so bad
as seriously to affect the health or morals of children should the courts be
49
called upon to act.

In Ex parte Kananack, ° the court held that in a dispute relating
to custody, religious views afforded no grounds for depriving an
otherwise qualified parent of custody. In yet another case the courts
reversed a custody order where it appeared that in changing the
custody order from the divorced mother to the father, the court had
considered and given some weight to the circumstances that the
mother was a Jehovah's Witness and that the children were being
given instruction which might lead them to refuse to salute the flag,
perform military service, or celebrate Christmas in the customary
51
manner.
In a fairly recent case, the Supreme Court of Alabama specifically
4
0New York and Massachusetts appear to give controlling weight to the natural
parents' right to determine the child's religion. In re Santos, 278 App. Div. 373, 105
N.Y.S.2d 716 (1951); Petition of Goldman, 331 Mass. 647, 121 N.E.2d 843 (1954).
4T Mothershead v. Mothershead, 161 S.W.2d 669 (Kansas 1942).
48 In Re Sisson, 152 Misc. 806, 274 N.Y.S. 857 (1934); People ex. rel. Sisson v. Sisson,
271 N.Y. 285, 2 N.E.2d 660 (1936).
49 People ex rel. Sisson v. Sisson, 271 N.Y. 285,287-88, 2 N.E.2d 660, 661 (1936).
50 272 App. Div. 783, 69 N.Y.S.2d 889 (1947).
51 Commonwealth ex rel. Derr v. Derr, 148 Pa. Super. 511, 25 A.2d 769, cert. denied,
317 U.S. 631 (1942); Commonwealth ex rel. Kaufmann v. Kaufmann, 69 Montg. Co.
L.R. 292 (Pa. 1953); Reynolds v. Rayborn, 116 S.W.2d 836 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938);
Salvaggio v. Barnett, 248 S.W.2d 244 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952); Stone v. Stone, 16
Wash.2d 315, 133 P.2d 526 (1943).
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rejected the contention that the divorced wife's subsequent marriage
to one of Jewish faith rendered her unfit or unsuitable for the custody
of her three-year old child. The court said that such marriages were not
forbidden by statute or violative of social morality, and that while
the second husband's character was a pertinent factor, he was admitted
to be "a man of exemplary habits and splendid character."52
In two Pennsylvania cases, illustrative of the principles noted above,
religion became a factor in the dispute over the custody between a
parent and a relative. The courts again placed little weight on the
matter of religion. Noting that the father had not been concerned
with his son's religious faith until proceedings for support were
brought, the court held that it was error for the trial court to require
that the boy (who had been baptized a Catholic) be removed from
the custody of his Protestant aunt. He had been placed in the aunt's
custody by his mother six years earlier. The court stated that the
53
welfare of the child was the binding consideration.
More recently in Sabath v. Mendelson,54 the court refused to confirm custody to the minor girl's maternal uncle to whom she had
been entrusted by the deceased mother, who had originally been
awarded custody in the divorce decree. The uncle asserted that the
child had developed deep roots in the maternal family and the Jewish
religion which it practiced. The child's father had remarried a Protestant. The court noted that the father was of the Jewish faith and
would give the child adequate opportunity to practise her religion
and the Protestant stepmother agreed to cooperate.
Where it can be shown, of course, that the religious doctrines of
the party seeking to obtain custody do, in fact, seriously threaten the
health or physical well-being of the minor, or would lead the custodian to neglect the minor, the court may prefer to award custody to
the other party.5 5

E. Preference of the Child
The preference of the child, while an overall factor in determining
custody, is secondary to the paramount consideration of what is for
52

Goldman v. Hicks, 241 Ala. 80, 1 So.2d 18 (1941).

53 Commonwealth ex rel. Weber v. Miller, 84 Pa. Super. 409 (1925).
54

187 Pa. Super. 73, 143 A.2d 665 (1958).

55 See People ex rel. Trafford v. Trafford, 12 N.Y.S. 43 (1890); Battaglia v. Battaglia, 9 Misc.2d 1067, 172 N.Y.S.2d 361 (1958).
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the best interest of the child. The general rule has been stated as
follows:
The wishes of a child who is sufficiently mature to be able to formulate a rational opinion and desire as to its custody may be considered by the court, but
the child's desire is not conclusive.56

Where the child has arrived at an age to choose for himself, the
court will not take him from one parent and give him to another
57
against his wishes.

Only in doubtful cases will the wishes of immature children be
given consideration in awarding custody. 8 A slight preference of
the child for one parent is not taken into consideration at all.5 9 In this
case, involving a thirteen-year old boy, the Illinois Supreme Court
remarked:
In a very doubtful case the wish of the child is to be considered and given
weight, but we do not think that the wish of the child in this case should have
any great weight in determining custody. The testimony of the child is
that he may be equally satisfied to remain with his father after he goes with
him, and that he does not have any serious objection to going with his father
and will not be seriously grieved by being separated from his aunt.60

On the other hand, a strong attachment by a sickly seven-year old
boy to his mother, combined with what the court labelled a "decided
disinclination" to go to his father, led the court to decide in one case
that the best interest of the child would be served by continuing the
boy in the custody of his mother.6
In Wellcome v. Wilk, 2 the strong preference of a twelve-year old
girl for her father and stepmother, both of whom she loved, was a
factor in continuing her custody in the father. This evidence and the
further evidence that when the natural mother gave up the custody
of the child five years earlier, the child had expressed the desire to
live with her father and had refused to attend school or obey her
mother explain the Appellate Court holding that custody was to be
continued with the father.
It is evident that the child's preference is not a very compelling
56 17A Am. Jur. Divorce & Separation§ 818 (1957).
57 Hewitt v. Long, 76 Ill. 399 (1875).
58 Gresser v. Guynn, 33111. App. 610,73 N.E.2d 671 (1947).
59

Stafford v. Stafford, 299 111.438, 132 N.E. 452 (1921).

60 Id. at 450-51, 132 N.E. 457 (1921).

61 Umlauf v. Umlauf, 128 111. 378, 21 N.E. 600 (1889).
62 339 111. App. 444,90 N.E.2d 260 (1950).
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ground for the award of custody, viewed alone, although the child
63
may be consulted when it is practical to do so.

F. FinancialStatus of Parent or Ability to Provide
Another factor considered by the court in granting or modifying
the custody decree would relate to the ability of a parent, financial
and otherwise, to support the child, house it, and educate it.
Illinois courts are not impressed with disproportionate financial
resources of the parents and will grant custody to the less well-off
parent should the interest and welfare of the child require it.
In Williams v. Williams,6 4 in seeking to have the original custody
decree changed in his favor, the father placed much emphasis on the
fact that the minor then in the mother's custody might be deprived
of a remainder interest in a trust valued at 125,000 dollars unless the
child's custody be transferred to the father. The court noted that the
trust deed so providing cannot have any effect on the issue of who
is entitled to the custody of the five-year old boy. The court added:
As far as Charles is concerned, this court is well aware of the financial advantages that would accrue to this boy if the terms of the deed were complied
with. On the other hand, financial considerations, after a certain point, are
entitled to little consideration in the determination of the welfare of a child
in a case of this type, especially where it appears that the father is contributing
amply to his support. 65

Similarly in Kent v. Kent,6" the court held that the fact that the
minor, who had been placed in the custody of his maternal grandmother upon the divorce of his parents, was living with strangers who
could do more for him in a financial way than could his father did
not preclude the court from subsequently awarding custody of the
child to the father who had remarried. Said the court of the financial
argument:
We have never known of any Court adopting this line of reasoning and we
67
decline to do so.

In Horn v. Horn68 the court was asked to decide between the relative
financial ability of the minor's mother and the paternal grandparents
63 Cf. Buehler v. Buehler, 373 Ill. 626,27 N.E.2d 466 (1940).
64320 Il. App. 354, 51 N.E.2d 284 (1943).
Id. at 356, 51 N.E.2d 285.
06 315 111. App. 284,42 N.E.2d 958 (1942).
67/d. at 290, 42 N.E.2d 961.
68 5 III. App.2d 346, 125 N.E.2d 539 (1955).
65
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(noting that the child's father had not asked for the custody of the
child). The court said:
The mother, having remarried, now desires the custody of the child, and an

investigation of her financial responsibility and the home in which she lives
has been so satisfactory that the court felt justified in changing the order and
giving the child to her. It is the opinion of this court that however financially
responsible the paternal grandfather may be, and however suitable he may be
to rear this child, that any rights he may have must necessarily be subordinate
to those of the mother.69

Where the divorced wife did not have sufficient housing to accommodate her three boys, the court did not abuse its discretion where
it awarded custody of the six-year old boy to the husband, and the
70
two- and three-year old boys to the wife.
Where the mother had remarried and lived in her second husband's
home, the court modified the prior decree awarding custody of an
eleven-year old girl to the husband, it appearing that the husband did
not offer adequate accommodations for the girl so that she had to live
71
with the husband's father and step-mother out-of-State.
G. Present Surroundings of the Home into which the Child is to be
Brought.
In Tosb v. Jones,72 the decree was modified to transfer custody to
the father, subject to the mother's rights of reasonable visitation,
where the mother was not maintaining a home in which the child
could be reared in the security of a family relationship. The mother
had remarried, yet was not living with her second husband. Until the
return home of this second husband, the mother was obliged to seek
work outside the home and would thus be forced to leave the care
of the child to others.
The court here was undoubtedly influenced by the "distinct contrast" between the home of the father and the complete lack of similar
facilities on the part of the mother, in addition to which she had to
work away from the home.
Where, of course, mother and father have equally adequate homes,
the court will have to decide on the proper custody order by taking
other matters into consideration.7
69 Id. at 354, 125 N.E.2d 539.
70 Malczyk v. Malczyk, 12 I. App. 95, 138 N.E.2d 690 (1956).

Lucado v. Lucado, 1 111.App.2d 548, 118 N.E.2d 40 (1954).
11. App.2d 215, 117 N.E.2d 307 (1954).
73 Cf. Bates v. Bates, 166 1. 448,46 N.E. 1078 (1897).
71

72 1
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H. Past Misconduct or Fault of Parent as Established in the Divorce
Proceedings
Past misconduct of a parent does not necessarily disqualify such
parent for purposes of custody if other factors make it desirable that
the parent be given custody. Even present misconduct may have that
effect.
There are several early decisions in this state in which the husband
was disqualified from obtaining custody because of extreme and repeated cruelty to the wife, or because of desertion by the husband.75
But in Hogsett v. Hogsett,76 the court held that the fact that the
divorce was granted to the wife on grounds of extreme and repeated
cruelty did not forfeit the father's rights to custody of the children
at a later time upon proper petition for modification.
It will be recalled that the principle that the mother is entitled to
the custody of children of tender years will not be invoked where
compelling evidence shows that she is not a fit and proper person for
custody. 77 In this connection the Nye case 78 is of interest. The original
divorce decree established the mother's fitness for custody of the
minor. It was not known at the time that the mother had a relationship
with a man other than her husband. Even so, the lower Appellate
Court held that it could not assume that the divorce court would have
disapproved the original custody award had the testimony concerning
the mother's pre-divorce conduct been offered.
Said the court:
M

Where the mother is able to care for her minor daughter and is not shown to
lack the proper attributes of good motherhood, past misconduct, where the
evidence indicates no probable future misconduct, should not be the basis for
79

denying custody to the mother.
74

Becker v. Becker, 79 11. 532 (1875).

75

Hewitt v. Long, 76 111. 399 (1875).

76 11 11. App.2d 332, 137 N.E.2d 99 (1956).
77 Nye

v. Nye, 411 Ill 408, 105 N.E.2d 300 (1952).

78 Ibid.
79 Id. at 417, 105 N.E.2d 303. The bristling dissent of Bristow, J. cannot be easily
overlooked: "I am disposed to dissent to the majority opinion in this case because it
disregards one of the cardinal rules in judicial review, namely, that the findings of a
trial court on issues of fact will not be disturbed unless they appear to be against the
manifest weight of the evidence .... The prevailing opinion rejects the determination
of the trial court that the divorce decree pertaining to the custody question should be
modified because of changed conditions. This language was employed in connection
therewith: 'Assuming defendant's allegations are true, there is no showing here of a
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On the other hand, in the Wolfrum case ° in which the mother was
shown to have adequate physical care and to have affection for the
children, the evidence disclosed "a shocking course of adulterous
conduct by... [the mother] with a man who himself is married and
the father of a family.""' The court noted that assuming her prior
conduct condoned, there was still no assurance that it would improve
in the future. The ruling in the Nye case"2 was held inapplicable;
while the mother in that case had committed adultery, she later married her paramour and her previous indiscretions were considered
to have come to an end.
Obvious immorality by a mother who was remarried to an operator
of a gambling house led to denial of custody. The court reasoned:
Parental example has great influence in the development of young children,
and due regard should
be had to the character and conduct of the parties in
83
awarding children.
change in conditions warranting a modification of the custody decree.' In other words,
Bruckner and Constance were recognized adulterers, at the time of the divorce decree.
Therefore, the court adopts the unique position that since they simply continued their
clandestine relationship there was no change in conditions." Id. at 417, 419, 105 N.E.2d
at 305-06.
80 Wolfrum v. Wolfrum, 5 111. App.2d 471,126 N.E.2d 34 (1955).
81 Id. at 476, 126 N.E.2d 36.
82 411 Ill. 408, 105 N.E.2d 300 (1952). In Frank v. Frank, 26 111. App.2d 16, 167 N.E.2d
577 (1960), the Appellate Court relied on Nye v. Nye, supra, in transferring custody
of a boy from his father to the mother who during her marriage to the boy's father
had become pregnant by another man. Both parents were of the Catholic faith, although the mother was excommunicated after obtaining a divorce and marrying her
Protestant paramour. See I J. FAMILY LAW 139 (1961). She subsequently attended her
second husband's church. The mother had another child, the product of her second
marriage. She lived in a small house and was able and willing to care for the boy who
was living in crowded quarters in his father's apartment, although he had his own
bedroom. The mother further agreed to raise the boy in the Catholic faith, although
her family attended a Protestant church. The Appellate Court upheld the trial court's
finding that the mother was a fit and proper person to obtain custody. "No other
finding is made, but implicit in the modification order changing custody from the
father to the mother, is a finding that there were changed conditions since the divorce
decree, and that in the light of the changed conditions, the best interests of the child
were being served in entering the order. It was not necessary to find that the father be
found unfit in order that the modification of the order be justified." Id. at 19, 167 N.E.2d
at 579. The dissenting judge considered it wrong to change custody from the father to
the adulterous mother. The dissent emphasized the fact that the boy's half-sister and
both parents practiced the Protestant religion. The judge also observed that it was not
"just or reasonable to further injure and humiliate the innocent party to a marriage
who had lost his wife through the criminal intimacies of the erring spouse . . ." and
added: "The boy may later resent being brought up by a step-father who was the
cause of breaking up his home." Id. at 22, 167 N.E.2d at 581.
83 Cohn v. Scott, 231 Ill 556, 558, 83 N.E. 191, 192 (1907).
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RECONSIDERATION OF THE ORIGINAL CUSTODY DECREE

It may be well to note at this point that where the court is called
upon to modify the prior decree for custody, a clear showing is required that new and subsequent facts require such change. The decree
awarding custody being res judicata as to rights of the parties, the
original decree is binding upon the parties "under the same facts and
so long as the same conditions exist as did at the time of the hearing
and order. '8 4 Any other rule would permit the same or some succeeding judge "to review, and to reverse, alter, or modify a decree, upon
'8 5
the facts existing at the time of its entry.
The change of circumstances doctrine is subject to an important
qualification. Changed circumstances alone do not necessarily move
the court to modify the existing decree. The court may leave custody
unchanged, even though circumstances did change, where the best
interest of the child so requires it. In Maupin v. Maupin the court
declared:
It should be plain ... that the mere fact that there has been a change in conditions is not sufficient in itself to modify a decree, unless those changed conditions affect the welfare of the child. As stated by another chancery court:
"But the changing circumstances must be, obviously, those that affect the
children-not those that concern the parents."86

Indeed, "it must positively appear that it is to the best interest of
children affected by the proposed change that . . . [a change] can
be made, as otherwise it must be denied."87 The new conditions must
have arisen subsequent to the prior decree giving custody, or must
have existed at the time of the decree, but were not brought to the
attention of the court. Thus where the court was aware at the time
it granted the custody of the child to the mother that the mother
could not support it unless she worked, the same court could not base
84 211 111.519, 525, 71 N.E. 1077, 1079 (1904). The court which granted the divorce
or separation order has continuing and exclusive powers to make orders with regard to
the custody and maintenance of the child and a petition to modify the prior decree
must be made in the court where the decree was rendered. Cf. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 40,
§ 19 (1959). Stafford v. Stafford, 299 Il1.438, 132 N.E. 452 (1921); Nye v. Nye, 411 Ill.
408, 105 N.E.2d 300 (1952).
85 Maupin v. Maupin, 339 Ill. App. 484,489,90 N.E.2d, 236 (1950).

86 Id. at 489,90 N.E.2d 236.
87 Wick v. Wick, 341 Ill. App. 478,94 N.E.2d 602 (1950).
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transfer of custody of the child to the father on the fact that the
mother was working.""
The burden of proving a material change in circumstances since
the divorce or separation decree awarding custody of the minor child
is upon the person seeking a change.8 9 The change, furthermore, must
be permanent, for changes in custody "should not be subject to spasmodic variation merely to follow fluctuations in the employment or
resident status of one of the parents, who does not have custody...
in absence of proof that welfare of [the] child requires such modification." 90
CONCLUSION

The pole star in all custody matters between parents is what is for
the best interest of the child. 9 '
88

Callan v. Callan, 5 IM1.App.2d 480, 125 N.E.2d 854 (1955); Harms v. Harms, 323
Ill. App. 154, 55 N.E.2d 301 (1944).
App.2d 284, 131 N.E.2d 555 (1955); Martinec v. Sharapata,
89 Israel v. Israel, 8 Ill.
328 Ill. App. 339, 66 N.E.2d 103 (1946); Erickson v. Erickson, 344 Ill. App. 550, 101
N.E.2d 619 (1951).
90 Israel v. Israel, supra.
91 With apologies to Dean Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability
to the Consumer), 69 YALE L. J. 1099 (1960), conclusion, at 1148. Weinman, The Trial
Judge Awards Custody, 10 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 721, 735 (1940), wisely notes that
in the end "social factors usually outweigh legal factors, when one analyzes the responsibility of judges today in deciding these challenging custody problems."
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